NEOLIBERALISM AND MEGA-EVENT SECURITY LEGACIES: THE 2010 FIFA WORLD CUP, CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA

Simone Eisenhauer, Daryl Adair and Tracy Taylor
University of Technology, Sydney, Australia

ABSTRACT
There is a considerable body of literature evaluating legacies of sport mega-events (Cornelissen, 2007; Cornelissen, Bob, & Swart, 2011; Fourie & Santana-Gallego, 2010; Gold & Gold, 2005; Hall, 1998, Preuss, 2007ab). However, with few exceptions (Boyle & Haggerty, 2009; Coaffee, Fussey & Moore, 2011; Giulianotti & Klauser, 2010) there has been little research into what has been described as the ‘security legacies’ of large one-off events. Mega-events that are not permanently based at the same site - ambulatory spectacles that move from country to country - may produce ‘a range of security-related strategies and impacts which continue to have significance beyond the life of the sport event’ (Giulianotti & Klauser, 2010, pp. 53-54). In short, although the mega-event moves from one site to another, a range of legacies - whether planned or unplanned - may remain in the host environment. Legacies include expertise and resources in respect of post-event security. Therefore, this study assesses the impact of the 2010 FIFA World Cup (FWC) in terms of security measures, and their subsequent legacy focussing on particular changes pertaining to security measures: practices (visible policing), technologies (CCTV and equipment) and externally imposed social transformations (removal of the undesired) that result from event hosting.

KEY WORDS
Event security; Legacy; Host venue

INTRODUCTION
This study analyses the impact of the 2010 Football World Cup, FWC in terms of security measures, and their subsequent legacy (or otherwise) in one of the key host cities - Cape Town (CoCT). This paper concentrates on particular changes pertaining to security measures: practices (visible policing), technologies (CCTV and equipment) and externally imposed social transformations (removal of the undesired) that result from event hosting. The word ‘impact’ has to be distinguished from the meaning of ‘legacy’. The impact is caused by a short-term impulse, while legacy is assumed to have a long-term effect (Preuss, 2007b).

In terms of mega-event research, the FWC was chosen as one of the highest profile sporting spectacles in the world (Schwarz, 2010). The RSA was selected because the study explores the staging of a mega-event in the context of a developing nation. Cape Town was chosen as the single case under investigation because of its distinctive public space arrangements, which included public viewing areas (PVAs), such as a 2.5 km long Fan Walk, FIFA Fan Fest (FFF) and several FIFA and municipal fan zones.
First, this article illustrates the theoretical framework underpinning this study. This is followed by an overview of literature pertaining to the genre of sport-mega-events, and a range of associated security and surveillance management issues. Second, a literature review is provided relevant to urban development, ‘world-cities’, and destination marketing in mega-event contexts. Then, the research context and the methodological approach underpinning the study are described, and thus signposts assumptions and principles that underpin the research approach. Moreover, this article presents findings from primary and secondary data relating to securitisation legacies for the host city. The findings provide a reading of some of the mechanisms through which the aspiring ‘world-cities’ prescribe the establishment of security measures, which underline the business rationale associated with the hosting of a sport mega-event. Finally, this paper analyses the results of the research and their relevance to the existing literature on security risk management in the mega-event context.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
While cognisant of the overall variety and complexity of many different event spaces (e.g., stadium, training grounds, team hotels), we chose to focus on Cape Town’s ‘City Bowl’ where most internationally mediated fan activities such as the FFF and Fan Walk took place. These public urban spaces were securitised in accordance with the interests of the event organiser (the RSA and Cape Town) for the brand protection of the event owner (FIFA) and official sponsors. As will later be explained, a neoliberal research paradigm, complemented by the concept of ‘festivalisation of urban politics’ (Häussermann & Siebel, 1993), provides the theoretical apparatus to evaluate and interpret security legacies at the 2010 FWC in Cape Town.

Security Legacies and Sport Mega-Events
Mega-events are transient but their effects are often not. Mega-event security in any specific urban locality also leaves within the host environment a legacy of ideas and practices that can shape the pursuit of safety and security at the local level. Security legacies are primarily important for the host nation/city, not for the event organisers. Therefore, as Boyle and Haggerty (2009c) have asserted, long-standing legacies pertaining to security are not unintentional; they are ‘explicit objectives’ (p. 266). The connection between security legacies and the commercial interests of the RSA government became apparent when South African Police Minister Nathi Mthethwa stated:

“Our security plans consist of achieving better policing, efficient criminal justice system and involvement of various local and international partners. This must leave a lasting security legacy that must guarantee further attraction of visitors post the tournament (2010c).”

This statement was part of a pre-event justification to spend money on security, with the assumption of benefits to tourism thereafter which is a typical claim by organisers, but rarely proven to be substantive. Drawing upon Preuss’s (2007b) definition of ‘legacy’, security legacies are referred to as a range of tangible and intangible security strategies, structures and impacts (positive and negative) created for and by a sport mega-event that continue to have significance beyond the life of the event itself. In contrast to, for example, social and image sport mega-event legacies, long-term security legacies are normally strategically planned for by public authorities.
(Boyle & Haggerty, 2009). Thus, not only do mega-events provide a platform to test so-called ‘hard event structures’ (Preuss, 2007b, p. 208), such as surveillance system technology (Giulianotti & Klauser, 2010), but also more than often these technologies remain in place or are extended in order to ‘combat crime’ after an event bid had failed or the event itself is over (Coaffee & Wood, 2006; Samatas, 2007, 2011ab; Wood & Abe, 2011). This scenario could be observed in the RSA’s Olympic bidding context. The government introduced an extensive security system into areas posited as likely venues and tourist accommodation centres. After the bid had failed, the systems remained and were even extended with the stated aim of combating crime (Coaffee & Wood, 2006; Minnaar, 2007). Hence, sport-mega-events have been described as a ‘laboratory’ for introducing security systems, as well as possessing a catalytic function for CCTV networks (Eick, 2011, Giulianotti & Klauser, 2010; Samatas, 2007, 2011ab). Sport mega-event security in any specific urban locality also leaves within the host environment a legacy of what Preuss (2007b, p. 208) has called ‘soft event structures’, including legislation, knowledge and practices which may shape the undertaking of safety and security at the local level.

In general terms, event owners (e.g. FIFA) and organisers tend to justify the territorial expansion of security as ‘matter of fact’, and portray the introduction of security measures in host spaces as a public benefit – these being sensible quests for patron safety and operational efficiency (Boyle & Haggerty, 2009c). Critics, however, have identified other agendas in these organisational initiatives (Bernhard & Martin, 2011; Samatas, 2007). Most common are complaints about overly intrusive security protocols and excessive surveillance measures, both of which can compromise, rather than enhance, patron experiences at an event. For example, Samatas (2011a) assessed Athens 2004 and Beijing 2008 Olympic Games’ surveillance systems in relation to their authoritarian effects and legacies. Samatas concluded that ‘post-9/11 Olympic security and surveillance have authoritarian effects, which are dependent on global factors like anti-terrorist and neo-liberal policies, and local factors such as the type of host regime, culture and society’ (p. 3347). Moreover, she found that the ‘surveillance systems have an emerging anti-democratic legacy’ (p. 3347) which extends beyond the hosting of the sport mega-event. Security at sport mega-events is now big business and involves unprecedented expenditure. Despite the growing strategic and financial significance of security issues at sport mega-events, there is a lack of interdisciplinary research pertaining to security and surveillance at sport mega-events (Yu, Klauser & Chan, 2009). This lacuna is most pronounced for hallmark events staged in developing countries.

Matheson and Baade (2003), as well as Giulianotti and Klauser (2010), have suggested a binary categorisation of mega-event hosting nations, namely the Global North and Global South. However, this underestimates the intense differences and divisions that persist within semi-peripheral developing nations - either north or south. The nations of Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Korea, which combine advanced capitalist infrastructures with high levels of inequality, have been given the acronym (BRIICS: Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2009). For this paper, the categorisation of BRIICS is used, while other countries with a comparable lower Growth Domestic Product (GDP), such as the RSA, will be referred to as developing nations.
During the past decade, a macro-geographical shift has started to unfold as more sport mega-events are being hosted by developing and newly industrialised nations. For example, finalists for the 2004, 2008 and 2016 Olympic Summer Games included Cape Town and Buenos Aires, with Beijing winning the right to host the 2008 event and Rio de Janeiro the 2016 event. In 2010, Delhi hosted south Asia’s biggest-ever multi-sport event, the 85-nation Commonwealth Games. Furthermore, South Korea co-hosted the 2002 FWC, the RSA hosted the 2010 FWC, and Brazil will host the 2014 FWC Finals. Qatar, a small oil-rich, but under-developed Middle-Eastern country has won the bid to host the FWC in 2022. The political, socio-cultural and economic importance attached to these massive sport spectacles underscores the salience of emergent research in BRIICS contexts. The 2010 FIFA World Cup (FWC) in the Republic of South Africa (RSA) is one such mega-event that exemplifies this situation.

Matheson and Baade (2003) and Haferburg and Steinbrink (2010) have each independently suggested that there is a need to investigate whether the prevailing interpretations of sport mega-events apply to the same degree to nations in the developing and newly industrialised world. Since both developing and newly industrialised nations have started hosting sport mega-events, other event risks and threats may prevail (e.g., crime or strikes), and therefore security measures, risk priorities and security legacies are deemed to vary according to nation, geopolitical circumstances and development status (Giulianotti & Klauser 2010).

**Neoliberalism and ‘World-Cities’**

Neoliberal govern mentality can be described as the transfer of activities from the public realm to the market through direct privatisation, public/private partnerships, outsourcing, the creation of new and internal markets, and the establishment of conditions for competitive success (Clarke, 2004). In this paper’s context, neoliberal govern mentality will be used to examine the extent to which security and commercial activities in the CoCT have been relocated from the public realm to the commercial market as an outcome of the 2010 FWC.

The concept of the ‘world-city’ (Friedmann, 1986; Sassen 1991, 1994, 2001) complements neoliberal governs mentality. The world-city process involves major urban metropolises competing against each other on a global scale to attract investment from multinational corporations, public agencies, media, sport and leisure corporations, and tourists (Harvey, 1989). These self-proclaimed world-cities are at the forefront of global neoliberalisation (Peck & Tickell, 2002) wherein the ambitions of political and commercial leaders coalesce with urban planning and investment in development (Leitner et al., 2007). The neoliberal city is underpinned by governments either funding or subsidising perceived economic stimulus projects delivered by the private sector. This merging of public-private interests to engage in ‘place-competition’ (Judd & Simpson, 2003; Kearns & Philo, 1993; Rowe & McGuirk, 1999) is part of a neoliberal push by elected officials and entrepreneurs to compete as partners against rival world-cities for investment, commercial revenue, and global status (Florida, 2002). As Brenner and Theodore (2002b, p. 375) have stated, ‘cities have become strategic targets for an increasingly broad range of neoliberal policy experiments, institutional innovations, and politico-ideological projects’, including sport mega-events.
This may be understood as the ‘ascendency of a pro-growth ideology’ that views place-promotion as necessary ‘to generate economic growth in a fiercely competitive global market’, based on attracting people (i.e. tourism) and capital (i.e. foreign investors) to a location (Alegi, 2007, p. 328). Sport mega-events serve as an ideal tool to attain these goals.

Bernhard and Martin (2011) have argued that since ‘world-class’ cities strive to portray themselves as safe and secure, sophisticated security and surveillance measures at sport mega-events relate more to their symbolic capital for the host nation (i.e. protection of world-class status), rather than reflecting actual security risk assessments. This is because mega-events allow host cities to show off sophisticated and often extravagant security measures as a way of demonstrating their capacity to be part an exclusive ‘club’ of nations that have hosted an event of global importance. The securitisation of such an event is part of a reputational cachet showcasing the power, resources and skills of the host as manager of a world-class spectacle. Given this argument, ‘security’ has emerged as a crucial selling point in terms of ‘world-city’ place branding (Coaffee & Wood, 2006). Boyle & Haggerty (2011) have deftly argued that in a mega-event context, the business interests and security politics of a world-city coalesce. In their study of the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, where the focus was the city’s Project Civil City initiative, Boyle and Haggerty revealed how the staging of this sport mega-event promoted new forms of neoliberal urban development in concert with intensified levels of policing and securitisation. Crucially, in this case, promises by event organisers that development would bring benefits to the residents of the city were, according to critics, largely unrealised. Instead, they argued, civil society was compromised by the mega-event, with the colonising impact of Olympic-themed public spaces either fragmenting or excluding existing communities. Security measures therefore have the potential to compromise norms of public assembly, movement and expression in civil society.

Festivalisation of Urban Politics
From a critical neoliberal perspective, sport mega-events can be used as a political instrument to conceive or legitimise urban development strategies (Hall, 2006). This may occur in sport event locations ranging from advanced industrial nations to developing countries. However, the potential impact of associated urban development is disproportionately high in BRIC cities that are unfamiliar with hosting sport mega-events, and which undertake – as part of the bid process – to create stadia, infrastructure, event precincts and associated themed public spaces in order to ‘transform’ an urban environment into a ‘showcase’ for visitors and global audiences (Black & Van Der Westhuizen, 2004). These types of urban spaces and places are ‘spectacularised’: they become the outward face of the mega-event and the window through which patrons and viewers experience it (Bélanger, 2000, 2009; Ponzini, 2012). This presupposes aesthetically pleasing festive spaces; theatres of sport beyond the playing fields. Critically, though, these zones are branded, themed, secured, monitored and commercialised to suit the varied, yet confluent, interests of the dominant mega-event stakeholders. In the process, the associated environment is typically transformed in order to draw a curtain and then set the stage for a global media spotlight to shine. What was once public space and civil society becomes event space; a so-called ‘society of the spectacle’ (Debord, 1983, p. 1).
Häussermann and Siebel (1993) termed this phenomenon the ‘festivalisation of urban politics’, which is intended to describe government and entrepreneurial support for large-scale cultural and sport events ‘to support image building and catalyse associated urban development’ (Steinbrink, Haferburg & Ley, 2011, p. 15). In this respect, ‘development’ has a particular salience: it means to ‘clean up’ an event precinct and to rid this environment of ‘unwanted’ objects and people (i.e. old buildings and impoverished local residents). Rather than meeting the needs of civil society and citizens, the festivalised mega-event reconfigures urban spaces to satisfy the aspirations of governments and commercial interests. Locals must ‘fit in’ with the festivalised urban agenda; the spaces they once occupied are now under the imprimatur of event organisers.

It is important to acknowledge that festivalisation only becomes a possibility with the realisation of the ‘world-class’ city: global in outlook, investor-friendly and the national hub for business; a site with political profile and cultural cachet, and a destination favoured by tourists (Häussermann & Siebel, 1993; Sassen, 2001). The more that these planning boxes can be ‘tick ed’, the more likely a city is to be taken seriously as a site for mega-events, the selection of which is driven overwhelmingly by neoliberal ideology and its associated confluence of government and commercial interests (Kruger & Heath, 2012; Yu, Wang & Seo, 2012).

The scale, scope and impact of festivalisation depend fundamentally on context. Baasch (2009), in her study of the 2006 FWC in Hamburg, found that this city did not need to be festivalised because the required local urban infrastructure was already well established. As a consequence, there was no need to spatially transform or reconfigure the event environs. This meant there was little disruption to civil society, and local residents were more likely to be engaged with the event itself. By contrast, Steinbrink et al. (2011) found considerable evidence of festivalisation in the context of the 2010 FWC in the RSA. They discovered the forced removal of residents from event precincts in major South African cities, constraints to informal trade in civil society, and the marginalisation of many residents on the urban fringes; the latter also had limited access to transportation (the focus of which was in the event hub). These contrasting case studies indicate that the economic status of a host city is a significant driver of the nature, scope and scale of festivalised development strategies in a mega-event context.

At its core, festivalisation may be understood as an instrument that, depending on context, can be used to drive urban restructuring as a by-product of staging a mega-event. Neoliberal cities with an entrepreneurial agenda may strategically use an event bid to put forward major developments, but not necessarily with widespread public consultation. Under a festivalised model, a successful bidder is then ‘obliged’ to deliver on its infrastructure promises, which can enable the fast-tracking of urban projects – irrespective of any local opposition. The host city can safely argue that it has to comply with the event owner’s expectations, as promised in the bid document submitted years earlier (Steinbrink et al., 2011).

**Cape Town’s Entrepreneurial Security Agenda**

CoCT has been noted for ‘world-class’ ambitions, including an outward-focused service economy, the creation of tightly networked business hubs connected to other world cities via high-tech transportation and telecommunication systems, as well as the development of world-class facilities to cater to a trans-national elite (McDonald, 2008). Moreover, one of CoCT’s place
branding strategies is raising its global profile as a leading events destination, as it’s (albeit unsuccessful) bids for the summer Olympic Games in 2004 and the 2006 FWC illustrate.

For Castells (1994, 1996, 2000), the new global economy and the emerging informational society have created a new spatial form – ‘mega-event cities’ – which form the nodes of the global economy and are bound together through electronic communications to create what he calls the ‘network society’. Specialised public transit systems more closely integrate a ‘world’ city into global markets, thereby making the city more attractive for business activities (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). The resulting ‘premium network spaces’ are ‘geared to the logistical and exchange demands of foreign direct investors, tourist spaces or socioeconomically affluent groups’ (Graham & Marvin, 2001, p. 100) as the CoCT example will illustrate.

CoCT is a complex city with profound economic and social contrasts. The urban design of the metropolis can be described as an attempt to create a modern Western city on the southern tip of Africa with a view to making it an attractive destination for European immigrants and tourists. The central business district (CBD) is situated in the City Bowl (geographically not in the City’s centre). The suburbs along the beautiful coast and the mountain slopes are still predominantly ‘white’ residential areas, whereas most ‘black’ and ‘coloured’ neighbourhoods are on the Cape Flats (Haferburg, Golka and Selter, 2009), which are characterised by poverty, crime and violence. Public transport into the CBD is often unsafe and also expensive. As a result, access to the city’s economic opportunities and recreational facilities is limited for many inhabitants of the townships (Rospabe & Selod, 2007).

The security industry in the RSA is the most rapidly growing industry in the country in terms of job creation and new businesses being founded in the private sector. As a percentage of GDP, the nation has the largest private security sector in the world (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2007). Public policing, not only in CoCT but also in many other major cities around the world, has undergone a process of neoliberal reform: many of the security functions previously regarded as the domain of the state have been privatised and outsourced. A more fragmented and defensive micro-geography of secured spaces is apparent, and this has been reinforced by the emergence of an often heavily armed private security sector, which has mushroomed in the post-Apartheid period, substantially outnumbering the police (Taljaard, 2008). Private spending on security personnel rose by a factor of 400 between 1996 and 2009. Private security in the RSA is now worth R14 billion (USD 1.9 billion) a year, with 300,000 registered guards (The Economist, 2009). The sector’s security officers outnumber the police by ratios of between 3:1 and 7:1 (Van der Spuy & Lever, 2010). In addition, the budget of the South African Police Service (SAPS) saw a growth of 58 % from the 2003/04 to the 2007/08 financial year. The budget was further enhanced for the 2010 FWC (Mbola, 2009). SAPS had a budget of about R1.3 billion (equivalent to USD 146 million) (GCIS, 2010a) to address safety and security strategies at the FWC. The 2010 FWC put the RSA and CoCT on the world football stage and in the global media. This provided RSA with a rationale to access security markets world-wide and, using the football event as a backdrop, substantially increase its surveillance equipment, weapons capability, and related policing resources. As we will argue, the FWC provided an opportunity for RSA to strategically improve its capacity to monitor and secure public spaces both during and in the wake of this event.
Policing and security in CoCT is driven by the ‘entrepreneurial’ agenda of the global network of cities (Samara 2010a, b). Public policing, not only in CoCT but in many other major cities around the world, has undergone a process of neoliberal reform: many of the security functions previously regarded as the domain of the state have been privatised and outsourced. A more fragmented and defensive micro-geography of secured spaces is apparent, which has been reinforced by the emergence of an often heavily armed private security sector. In RSA this has mushroomed in the post-Apartheid period, with the private security sector substantially outnumbering state police (Taljaard, 2008).

CoCT’s current policing strategy has been questioned by several scholars. For example, Samara (2010a) criticised CoCT neoliberal strategy which frames crime as a security threat because of the danger it is thought to pose to market-led growth. Thus, Samara argues that urban governance in the townships increasingly takes on the character of what Davis (1992b) describes as ‘containment strategy’ (p. 161).

Jensen has stated that the neoliberal trend appears to be that security in upper- and middle-class Cape Town is becoming the over-riding priority for the government’s agendas (Jensen, 2010); this in turn encourages unequal provision of security services (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008). Since the security provision was already fragmented in the Apartheid era, Samara (2010a, p. 197) has suggested that ‘current approaches to urban renewal risk exacerbating social instability by reproducing aggressive forms of policing associated with the repressive Apartheid regime’. Moreover, according to Haskins (2007, p. 7), ‘safety and security has been one of the priority areas in Cape Town’s Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) for the past five years and will feature as a priority in the next IDP (2007/8-2011/12)’.

Organised business has been proactive in terms of influencing the state’s social control measures through a combination of social crime prevention and urban renewal projects via City Improvement Districts (CIDs). Samara (2010a, p. 651) has stated that within the CID model, ‘the language of economic growth and investment is at the same time a language of security, narrowly tailored to refer to securing certain processes and populations in certain places and excluding others from these same places’. She has also noted (2010b) that the geographic area now bound by the CID in Cape Town continues to be defined by practices and structures of ‘racial governance’, as the poor and homeless (who are overwhelming black or coloured) are in effect prevented from utilising the city’s public spaces. Samara (2010b), and Abrahamsen and Williams (2007) have each discovered that within the CIDs there has been a clear shift towards a hybridisation of security governance (public/private partnerships), which is concurrent with the ‘revitalisation’ and de facto privatisation of public spaces in Cape Town’s CBD.

In general terms, visible poverty, petty crime and drug users have been the targets of increasing state surveillance and judicial repression since the 1990s (Davis, 1992a). In tracing the rise of these ‘nuisances’ over the last decades, Beckett and Herbert (2008, p. 9) have argued that ‘civility laws have significantly expanded local governments’ capacities to regulate urban residents and spaces’. These laws, which in the CoCT are operationalised as by-laws, have become a widespread practice for urban cities and municipalities in an effort to link urban renewal and the regulation of disorder (Beckett & Herbert, 2008; Coleman, 2004; Gibson, 2010). Beckett and Herbert (2008, p. 6) have suggested that these developments are important as:
They enhance and extend the segregate effects of architectural modes of exclusion as well as the ‘civility’ laws, undermine constitutional rights and due process, disperse and extend state surveillance throughout the urban environment, and contribute to the expansion of modernist institutions of control.

These trends have been particularly relevant to the RSA context. Over the past decade, state authorities in Cape Town have focused in particular on addressing ‘crime and grime’ through the deployment of visible policing, the enforcement of by-laws, the cleaning of streets, and the management of informal traders, the homeless and street children. Central to contemporary law enforcement in the CBD is attention to ‘quality of life’, which incorporates a heavily contested municipal by-law regarding ‘nuisances’ (CoCT, 2007). As its defenders in the CoCT often point out, the poor and non-white population are not meant to be singled out in the by-law regulations. Nonetheless, in practice, this is precisely the groups that are targeted, mainly when behaviours such as begging, lying, sitting and sleeping in public are focused upon. This by-law gives security guards, such as the Metropolitan Police, significant discretion to move along people living on the street, with no need for justification beyond the authority vested in them by the property owners of the Central City Improvement District (CCID), a power that in a sense far exceeds that of the public police (Shearing & Stenning, 2003).

**RESEARCH APPROACH**

Since there has been little research into what has been described as ‘security legacies’ of one-off events, mega-events not only involve an exercise of power but have profoundly important public relations dimensions and, therefore, require very significant planning and operational protocols to effectively manage risk. Thus, the present case study analyses the impact of the 2010 FWC in terms of security measures, and their subsequent legacy (or otherwise) in one of the key host cities - CoCT. In this paper we concentrate on particular changes pertaining to security measures: practices (visible policing), technologies (CCTV and equipment) and externally imposed social transformations (removal of the undesired) that result from event hosting. Hence, the analysis included what we have labelled as: (1) ‘governmental’; (2) ‘managerial’; and (3) ‘journalistic’ sources of public discourse. These categories of data were significant to this study because the research focuses on the views of selected stakeholders, each with different positions of authority, influence and ‘voice’ in debates about the security field. An inductive interpretative qualitative approach was used utilising a content analysis of a range of documents including minutes, public speeches, policies, contracts, official reports, media releases, and newspaper articles.

The case study approach is useful when examining mega-events. According to Orum, Feagin and Sjoberg (1991, p. 336), the case study ‘is a method that relies on the examination of a single instance of a phenomenon to explore, often in rich detail, the ‘how’s’ and ‘whys’ of a problem’. In a similar vein, Flyvberg (2006) has suggested that the context-specific knowledge that results from case study research is of more value than a search for universal truths and predictive generalisations, particularly when making theoretical contributions in a specialised field. Choosing a case study for its unique properties gives the researcher the opportunity to glean specific insights into a particular research problem (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2003). Ragin (1992, p. 225) has explained that single-case studies have many dimensions as they ’are
multiple in most research efforts because ideas and evidence may be linked in many different ways’. Chetty (1996) and Yin (2009) have both asserted that case study research enables the application of theories in context. Moreover, case study research aims to provide transferability of methodology and theory, meaning that researchers can undertake follow-up case analysis to establish broader trends. The case chosen for this study was selected using purposive sampling (also referred to as non-probability sampling), a technique that involves an explicit rationale for the selection of cases (Patton, 1990; Teddlie & Yu, 2007). For this study, it was crucial to select an appropriate research site because case studies must ‘locate the global in the local’ (Hamel, Daour & Fortin, 1993, p. v).

The 2010 FWC in the RSA was chosen for the following reasons. First, a number of developing and newly industrialised countries have recently hosted or are about to host mega-events, yet there is a distinct lack of analysis into mega-events in the context of the developing world, and in Africa especially (Cornelissen, 2004). According to Sassen (2004), there is also a relative lack of studies on urban city centres in both the developing world and BRICS contexts. Second, the FWC is one of the most celebrated and commercially valuable sporting spectacles in the world, with the largest cumulative television audience. In all, 32 teams took part at the 2010 FWC, matches were played in ten stadia in nine host cities, and approximately 20,000 journalists and 5,000 photographers were accredited for the event (Schwarz, 2010). Third, as the RSA’s sport landscape has broadened, it has also become more controlled. Sport entities have been challenged to comply with the requirements of newly promulgated legislation, the Safety at Sport and Recreation Events Bill, 2009 (GCIS, 2009). Results of an investigation conducted by Burger, Roets, Goslin and Kluka (2009) suggested widespread indifference to, or disapproval of, safety regulations in the context of major sport events in the RSA. The authors concluded that there is insufficient knowledge about newly imposed safety regulations. This is a problem commonly found in sport governance in developing nations.

In the South African 2010 FWC context, one in-depth case study was selected: namely, Cape Town. It is a city known as the preferred home for the affluent white South African population. In the Apartheid era, the large white population of Cape Town emphasised the fragmented construction of urban space more than any other South African city (Chidester, 2000; Western, 1981). Haferburg has pointed to Cape Town’s unique reputation as being the most segregated city after Apartheid, with the legacy of having been the nation’s ‘preferential labour area’ (2003, p. 69) for the people categorised as ‘coloured’. Also, Cape Town is one of the largest and economically most significant locations on the African continent. It is, however, also the least safe of the four largest cities in the RSA in terms of crime (Donson, 2008). While Cape Town is in many ways unique, ‘the challenges it faces and the vision for urban development being pursued by local economic and political élites are not’ (Samara, 2010a, p. 198). Thus, while this case is distinctive, with many unique properties, it also has characteristics that are relevant beyond that context.

In summary, case studies can be used for comparison and/or to provide a framework for data collection (Macnamara, 1999) while ‘utilizing a variety of sources of data’ (Keddie, 2006, p. 20). In addition, as detailed below, a variety of data sources were used to enhance internal validity, including: official documents; data from interviews; and media articles.
As will be highlighted in the next sections, this paper focuses on risk management from the perspective of the CoCT in terms of public security technologies and protocols post the 2010 FWC. Giulianotti and Klauser (2010) have suggested a categorisation of six kinds of security legacy associated with sport mega-events:

1. Technologies;
2. Practices;
3. Governmental policies and new legislation;
4. Externally imposed social transformations;
5. Generalised changes in social and trans-societal relations; and
6. Urban redevelopment.

The present authors concur that the first category has considerable potential to provide security legacies for host cities and nations. However, categories 2, 3, 4 and 6, where ‘zero-tolerance’ policing strategies and policies are applied, and slum clearance, ‘beautification’ and building programs are initiated, can also be observed in the CoCT context. Therefore, three aspects of this categorisation are particularly worth discussing: practices (visible policing), technologies (CCTV and equipment) and externally imposed social transformations (removal of the undesired).

2010 FWC Security Legacies
Following Giulianotti and Klauser’s (2010) categorisations described previously, this section identifies nation-wide (albeit with a particular focus on CoCT) security legacies deriving from the 2010 FWC. It focuses on FWC-specific initiatives that were meant to become permanent fixtures of the host city’s security structure: visible policing, new security equipment and technologies, and the removal of the ‘undesirable’ from the CBD. These security legacies are analysed to ascertain whether the utilisation of 2010 FWC security measures and equipment used in public spaces continued subsequently, and what became of the event spaces once the spectacle was over. Drawing on Häusserman and Siebel’s (1993) festivalisation theory, it will be argued that the 2010 FWC reinforced existing neoliberal urban development trends in the CoCT. As will be demonstrated, this was reflected at the 2010 FWC in three key aspects: socio-political issues; acceleration of security development; and constraints on public participation. Although these were temporary developments, their impact and legacy are of interest here.

Socio-political Issues and Visible Policing
The RSA and CoCT governments saturated the domestic media with claims that high expenditure on FWC security and surveillance equipment, technologies and resources would leave an important legacy in terms of the state’s efforts to tackle high rates of violent crime (McMichael, 2012). The national police spokesperson, Senior Superintendent Naidoo, asserted that, in the context of the FWC: ‘We are preparing ourselves for a worst-case scenario or any eventuality ... although we have the framework in place, we must deal with issues as they present themselves’ (Flak, 2009). Skills development and training opportunities, improved communication channels, cooperative governance, and public and private sector partnerships, as well as local community involvement, were identified as urgent and necessary, and would provide a ‘true legacy’ of the 2010 FWC (PGWC, 2011). According to Police Minister Mthethwa (2010b):
“Our security plans consist of achieving better policing, efficient criminal justice system and involvement of various local and international partners. This must leave a lasting security legacy that must guarantee further attraction of visitors post the tournament.”

While many of the structures and equipment used during the tournament have been re-used, the extent of the continuing use of visible policing to combat crime is rarely mentioned in the CoCT or the RSA government’s official reports. In October 2010, Mark Jansen, from the Department of Community Safety, stated proudly that SAPS officers ‘are still operating as if it is the World Cup’ (Laganparsad, 2010). However, the extent of the deployment of officers to combat crime was rarely mentioned or described too vaguely in police reports. For example, ‘some (police officers) will stay for as long as necessary’, Brigadier Sally de Beer, Police Spokesman, said (Laganparsad, 2010, p. 5). Johan Burger, Senior Researcher at the ISS suggested that it would be impossible to sustain the same high levels of police visibility. This is because during the tournament all police leave was cancelled, all their resources were available, and they had a budget to pay the police overtime (Burger, 2010). In Cape Town, Andrew Boraine averred that it was crucial to continue 2010 FWC policing measures and to ‘turn the exception of one month into the norm’. However, he also seems disappointed because:

“People came into our towns and they saw the SAPS patrolling everywhere. But, the, day after the World Cup, they went back to their bases. The Central City Improvement District security is still in place, but it is not the same security we had during the World Cup. Then Metrorail went back to how they had always been. It’s not good enough (Cape Town Partnership, 2010).”

Hollands and Khalane (2010), writing for the Mail and Guardian, reported a 10 % increase in the deployment of police officers compared to pre-FWC figures. ‘The extra cops will, however, be fitter, better shots and more disciplined’, promised the minister (Hollands & Khalane, 2010, p. 26). The RSA mainstream media reported that citizens interviewed at the event venues were mostly in favour of the continuation of a visible police presence (e.g., Laganparsad, 2010). According to the Minister of Police, Nathi Mthethwa, ‘the resources, the re-skillling of police, expertise and international best practices acquired’ during the World Cup ‘are serving as an enormous arsenal in our fight against crime’ (Mthethwa, 2010b). Security training and associated employment increased, while key international partnership networks were established (e.g., with INTERPOL and FWC participating countries). Thus, the FWC provided a basis for what might be termed a neoliberalising of urban security in Cape Town. Private/public security forces learned about new tactics and techniques. In doing so, police and other national security forces developed an understanding of ‘global best practice’ in respect of securing a mega-event.

The massive investments in safety and security infrastructure and service provision for the 2010 FWC was a major source of angst among local residents, many of whom felt that the safety and security strategy for 2010 was geared towards making tourists, participants and FIFA Family members safe rather than being a long-term legacy that would make a significant impact on crime. A study by Bassa and Jaggernath (2010) found that what was important to respondents
was the need to employ more policemen and ensure that security was stringent and visible throughout the year rather than just at the mega-event. Back in 2006, Swart and Bob (2007, p. 201) had asserted that 2010 would ‘provide ... the platform and the impetus to initiate proactive measures and evaluate existing strategies to ensure safe environments’ for both visitors and the general RSA populace. Fikile Mbalula, Deputy Minister of Police, also promised that visible policing in informal settlements and townships would be increased. However, on the contrary, a Parliamentary delegate, Mr Watson, stated that whilst cities and urban areas were flooded with police and SAPS vehicles, smaller towns and rural areas still suffered from a shortage of infrastructure (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2009). This shows a segregated spatial policing strategy.

Festivalisation strategies were evident when considering contrasts in the management of public spaces in inner-city Cape Town and its outer fringes during the FWC. This involved unequal and spatially fragmented provision of security services, with a strong emphasis on the inner-city. The policing strategy detailed the security arrangements for particular spaces – ‘hot spots’ – notably the stadia, practice venues, FIFA headquarters, public viewing areas (PVAs) (the FFF and the Fan Walk), media centres, hotels, public transport, air- and seaports, main routes, popular tourist attractions, official and public accommodation, restaurants, bars, event centres, shopping complexes, routes and red light areas (Directorate: Communication and Information Services, 2008; GCIS, 2009). During the 2006 FWC in Germany, public viewing was declared to be an official, integral part of the tournament. People unable to attend the spectacle ‘live’ were spatially accommodated and provided with a visual spectacle of the direct telecast of games via giant television screens and loudspeakers. Public viewing simply means the television broadcasting of sporting events in public places. Giving ticketless fans the chance to watch the matches is, however, only one of the purposes of PVAs.

Most notably, the FFF was extensively covered by the media. Overall, more than 5,200 accredited media members reported from the FFFs in the RSA (Namibia Sport 2010). By concentrating on the highly securitised FFF coverage, FIFA and the RSA optimised the prospect that beautified and sanitised images were shown. The highly controlled environment and the selected target market (middle-class patrons and international visitors) were less likely to attract disorder or have a negative appearance. This ‘hot spot’ strategy met the security expectations of FIFA and its sponsors, as well as to mollify apprehensions among tourists and affluent, white locals who resided in security-intensive gated communities. SAPS admitted that normal police operations, particularly in the FWC host cities and their surrounding areas, might be ‘affected’ during the period of the tournament (Directorate: Communication and Information Services, 2008).

Thus, while there were significant gains in terms of visible policing during the FWC, it appears as if this was not sustained post-event. This reinforces concerns raised by the residents in particular that the focus was on keeping FIFA officials, the media and tourists safe during the event rather than providing equal security provision for all in the country. Nevertheless private/public security forces learned about new tactics and techniques and developed an understanding of ‘global best practice’ in respect of securing a mega-event.
Acceleration of Security Development and Technologies

Hiller (2000) has argued that at sport mega-events, the key stakeholders – tournament owners, corporate sponsors and local organisers – are obsessed with security measures to safeguard their respective interests and assets. In terms of the 2010 FWC, considerable care was taken to ensure that every feature of the mega-event reflected a positive view of the FIFA brand and its sponsors, including the use of, and reliance on, security technology to safeguard the tournament and fan spaces. The RSA placed the same importance on security technology. The RSA government was pitching its own ‘product’: spectacular security (Boyle & Haggerty, 2005). In the media, technology was portrayed as an instrument to achieve a maximal level of dominance over RSA cities. Each piece of equipment was depicted as state of the art and beyond reproach in effectiveness and operation, ‘world-class’ and ‘cutting-edge’ (McMichael, 2012).

In the media it was reported that SAPS had a budget of about R1.3 billion (equivalent to USD 146 million) (GCIS, 2010) to address safety and security at the FWC. This is similar to the Sydney 2000 budget (USD 179.6 million), but only about one-eighth of the security budget of the 2004 Athens Games and 2006 Turin Winter Games, and less than 5% of the security expenses at the Beijing Games (Cornelissen, 2011). In this respect, it is interesting to note that FIFA President Blatter announced before the event that security ‘would rival that seen at the Beijing Olympic Games’ (DawnMedia.com, 2009). Approximately R640 million was allocated for the deployment of 41,000–44,000 officers (FIFA, 2009; South Africa: The Good News, 2010). Some R665 million was spent on procuring special security equipment, such as crowd management equipment and associated body armour. This expenditure was comparatively low considering other costs for hosting the 2010 FWC: R11.7 billion invested in 10 stadia and R13 billion to upgrade infrastructure, while ports of entry received R3.5 billion for renovations, and R1.5 billion was invested in broadcast technology (GCIS, 2010a).

The Minister of Police, Nathi Mthethwa, stated that ‘equipment acquired for the World Cup would benefit ongoing policing’ (Independent Online, 2010), and that ‘these investments are not only meant for the event but will continue to assist the police in their crime fighting initiatives long after the Soccer World Cup is over’ (Mthethwa, 2010b, p. 2). This demonstrates that CoCT had its own strategic interests in terms of playing the role of FWC event host.

In the case of RSA, and the context of Cape Town specifically, there was a determination to fast-track touted urban securitisation strategies. As the leading security official in the city put it: ‘A World Cup is a dream for every police chief … I can ask for anything, and I get it!’ (Pruis, 2011). There was, nonetheless, urgency in bringing to fruition security planning and associated technologies and apparatus. As the PGWC (2011a, p. 193) put it: ‘No one wanted fingers to be pointed at political parties or leaders, so the project was given due priority and proudly acknowledged by all as successful in the end’.

While the fast tracked measures were ultimately meant to serve the securitisation of the FWC, SAPS and public security agencies also used the FWC to develop or restock military arsenals. This was an opportunity to experiment with the containment and modification of public urban spaces to suit post-event aspirations of reconfigured state security and social control measures therein. It allowed increased state authority by extending the public/private security forces (440 jobs...
were created in Cape Town) and technology systems (196 cameras within nine months prior the event) in the inner city. Surveillance technology, which was accelerated by CoCT authorities, was touted as a measure that would allow the city’s police to keep pace with ‘world class’ security developments. This was also an opportunity for CoCT to demonstrate to citizens its latest surveillance capacities and security resources – both as a deterrent to potential felons or dissidents, and as a display of state power. New security technologies and equipment were flagged in the media and made public through pre-event testing.

These security measures are evidence of the festivalisation of urban spaces in the context of a mega-event, and, from a social control perspective, are an example of what Debord (1983, p. 1) has acerbically labelled a ‘society of the spectacle’. In this case, CoCT used the FWC as a neoliberal instrument to legitimise the development of its security capabilities during the event, but with an eye on their implementation thereafter.

Public Participation and Removal of the Undesirable
Neoliberal cities with an entrepreneurial agenda may strategically use a mega-event to put forward major developments, but not always with widespread public consultation. Under a festivalised model, the CoCT was ‘obliged’ to deliver on its infrastructure promises irrespective of any local opposition. Throughout the event planning process, local stakeholders were neither consulted, nor able to contribute towards, parliamentary guarantees in respect of the 2010 FWC. The local community demanded that CoCT honour its commitment to the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policy, which was aimed at generating business for SMEs, and black entrepreneurs more generally (Ngonyama, 2010). However, the African National Congress MP, Butana Komphela, stated that the BEE policy had not been seriously considered and nothing had been done for marginalised communities (SRPLGPCs, 2006). This lack of community involvement in decision-making is reflective of the festivalisation of space in a mega-event setting.

A key justification by the RSA and CoCT for providing public funding of the FWC was that this global event was ‘in the public interest’. That argument included a major economic rationale: there was a strong expectation that the FWC would create opportunities for national and local businesses (Dean, 2007). However, informal traders were denied the opportunity to trade within the event footprint. Moreover, Van Blerk (2011) found in his 2010 study of Cape Town that street children reported an increase in the number of arrests, and lamented the use of the ‘morphine touch’ machine, whereby spot checks and fingerprint readings enabled police to identify young people who had been charged with crimes for which they had not yet been tried. With the help of increased security personnel, ‘block kids’ were increasingly moved out of Cape Town’s CBD and relocated to an area which ‘was more hidden’ from the FWC precinct (Van Blerk, 2011, p. 34); they were eventually moved to the outskirts of the city. Another target group identified in the 2010 CoCT by-law were the homeless. A councillor in Ellis Park in Johannesburg asserted: We need to remove these [20,000] people, allocate them somewhere else...In the city we only need people who are able to pay...You can’t deal with 2010 if you still have these people in the street’ (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008, p. 208).

While Jordaan promised no evictions, newspaper reports and academic studies (e.g., Cronjé, Van Wyk & Botha, 2010) have suggested otherwise. In Cape Town, about 600 homeless and street
children were moved to a ‘relocation’ or ‘transit camp’ in Blikkiesdorp, 30 km from the city centre (Webb, 2010). Blikkiesdorp, also known as ‘Tin Can Town’, was established in 2008, and was described by people affected as an apartheid-style camp designed as ‘temporary emergency accommodation’ for use of a period of about seven years (Webb, 2010). It has also been compared to a concentration camp by residents and in national and international media.

At the time of writing, Blikkiesdorp has become well-known for its high crime rate and its substandard living conditions. It has been called an informal settlement by CoCT officials despite its formal structure being built by the government. Since preparations for the 2010 FWC began in Cape Town, it has grown to hold more than 12,000 adults and 8,000 children (Webb, 2010). Inhabitants are from all parts of the Western Cape, including Mitchell’s Plain and The City Bowl surrounding areas. It contains approximately 1,600 one-room corrugated iron structures, 18sqm in size, originally to house 4,000 people. According to government officials, it has cost over 30 million rand to build (Webb, 2010). Therefore, this security legacy deepened the gap of security provision by hiding poverty from international fans and media, which subsequently intensified the fragmentation and marginalisation of already disadvantaged groups.

CONCLUSION
Drawing upon Giuliani and Klauser’s (2010) categorisation, this paper identified security legacies for CoCT deriving from the 2010 FWC. It refers to the subsequent FWC-specific initiatives that were meant to become permanent fixtures of the host city’s security structure: visible policing, new security equipment and technologies, and the removal of the undesired from the CBD. These security legacies were analysed to assess if the utilisation of 2010 FWC security measures and equipment used in public spaces remained in effect thereafter, and to what extent former event spaces may have changed. In accordance with Häussermann and Siebel’s (1993) festivalisation theory, the authors have argued that the 2010 FWC reinforced existing urban development trends in Cape Town. This festivalisation concept was reflected at the 2010 FWC in three key aspects: socio-political issues; acceleration of security development; and constraints on public participation.

For the FWC, Cape Town was conceptualised as a ‘world-class’ city, a place where tourists could enjoy a captivating natural environment and where businesses could invest with confidence. CoCT followed what Alegi has called ‘a pro-growth ideology’, wherein place-promotion was necessary ‘to generate economic growth in a fiercely competitive global market’, based on attracting people (i.e. tourism) and capital (i.e. foreign investors) to its shores (Alegi, 2007, p. 328). For CoCT, the 2010 FWC was a global marketing tool to pursue those goals.

Driven by its ‘urban entrepreneurial agenda’ (Harvey, 1989), CoCT reinforced and escalated its security measures, thus some leaving security legacies (camps, skills, arsenal) which deepened the gap of security provision by concentrating on the securitisation of the City Bowl. Greater security presence and new technological security measures (e.g., ‘morphine touch’ machine) led to an increase in the number of arrests, and the relocation of street children and the homeless to outskirts of the city, as Van Blerk’s study (2011) found. Subsequently, the fragmentation and marginalisation of already disadvantaged groups further intensified. Moreover, as the findings have shown, visible policing and ‘security for all’ amounted to far more limited legacies than
what had been touted ahead of the 2010 FWC. This ambivalent conclusion contrasts with the pretentious rhetoric of ‘longstanding security concerns addressed’ observed in post-tournament official statements. It appears that the concept of security legacies was used by authorities as a means to justify its pretexts for increasingly costly and sophisticated security measures introduced in a mega-event context.

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(SRPLGPC) Sports and Recreation and Provincial and Local Government Portfolio Committees


