After more than ten years of work in the coming XX century.

After more than ten years of work in the coming XX century.

Wittgenstein. Logical atomism can be briefly described as a philosophy of mathematical logic, and to be more precise, as a philosophy set out in the "Principles of Mathematics" in a great work on mathematical logic, written by A. Whitehead and B. Russell. which was published in three volumes in 1910-1913.

After more than ten years of work in the coming XX century. they developed a new type of logic, much broader than Aristotle’s, which included classical logic, but only as one of the individual cases.

The main difference between this logic and Aristotle’s logic can be formulated as follows: if Aristotle’s logic was actually the logic of classes, then Russell’s logic – the logic of statements. For example, the judgment "All mortals" states that the class of people is included in the class of objects that are mortal. In contrast, the logic of the Ras villages considers the relationship between expressions (for example, "If it rains, the streets are wet"). Both the sentences https://123helpme.me/narrative-essay-topics/ "it’s raining" and "it’s wet outside" are expressions, but (apart from that) they are in some way related to what Russell called an implication. Russell was able to show that in terms of this logic can also express the relationship between classes.

"Principles of Mathematics" were of great interest to philosophy, for at least two reasons:

a) the paper proves that mathematics, which has always been considered an independent discipline, is in fact a section of logic; b) Russell also argues that the basic structure of everyday or "natural" languages, such as English or Russian, is similar to the structure of the "Principles of Mathematics".

But although natural languages ​​are similar in this respect to the "Principles of Mathematics", they (languages) are unsuitable for philosophical analysis because they are more "vague". Accordingly, the paper expresses the belief that mathematical logic could give philosophy a honed to perfection tool for highlighting the meanings of sentences in any natural language. This, in turn, gives reason to hope that, finally, philosophical debates can be subjected to rigorous logical scrutiny.

Logical atomism received its most complete form and careful elaboration in the mysterious work of Raesel’s student Ludwig Wittgenstein. This book by Wittgenstein, called "Logical and Philosophical Treat" and published in 1922, is devoted to the development of one of the areas of logical atomism, which is now called the theory of reflections. According to Wittgenstein, the ideal language ("Principles") reflects the world (corresponds to the world), as does a geographical map.

If we need to know if Scottish city A is north of city B, we can use a map to find it, because the latter corresponds to the area in a certain sense. This is because the relationship between the points on the map is identical to the relationship between the points on the ground – the resulting language is like a map. It corresponds to the structure of reality. There is a corresponding object for each proper name of this language, and a corresponding property for each predicate. Thus, ideal language gives us a description of the structure of facts (events), since the latter consist of objects and their properties.

Philosophy of everyday language: D. Moore and Wittgenstein. Another important modern branch of analytical philosophy is sometimes called the philosophical "school of everyday language." The main thing that unites the philosophers arising in this direction is the denial that philosophical problems can be understood and solved using methods derived from formal logic. Thus, adhering to this "negative" view, they, despite a wide range of their "positive" approaches, tend to agree that it is necessary to begin with an analysis of everyday language, and only then look at what it will lead to in the field of philosophy.

One of the founders of this trend was J. E. Moore (1873-1958). In his views of the world, Moore defended the point of view of common sense, arguing that ordinary people are right when they say they know, and know very clearly that tables, chairs, etc. exist. In stating this, Moore noted, they are right because they use the word "know" in its conventional, everyday meaning. Therefore, those philosophers – skeptics or idealists – deny our ability to know the outside world, or err in their statement, or use the word "know" in some special, technical sense, which does not correspond to the statements of those who, in plain language, say that knows that tables, people and planets exist.

In the 1930s, L. Wittgenstein realized that the search for a language that would adequately reflect the world could not be successful. His new approach is outlined in the work "Philosophical Studies" which was published in 1952. a year after Wittgenstein’s death.

Early Wittgenstein, whom I knew closely, was extremely and passionately devoted to philosophical thought, had a deep understanding of its complex problems, and I saw in him a philosophical genius. The new Wittgenstein seems to be tired of thinking seriously, so he invented a doctrine that would justify the need for another occupation. Even for a moment I can’t believe that a consequences theory with such melancholy can be true. B. Russell

According to the new idea, the essence of language is not so simple: it (language) is an incredibly complex activity, studied in many ways and used in many ways, indescribable. There is a desire to comprehend this essence, that is, to penetrate into the "real" meaning of language, hidden behind the veil of everyday experience; this desire is connected with the activity of the philosopher. He is motivated by the impulse to find a simple picture, to build a simple model that would cover all known phenomena and in terms of which it would be possible to understand them.

According to Wittgenstein, the peculiarity of typically philosophical "problems" is that they can not be solved by mathematical or empirical methods (therefore, in particular, the attempt to solve them by means of ideal language will fail). The reason for this is that they contain "difficulties" that are manifested in the attempt of a thinking person to give a theoretically satisfactory picture of the facts known to him. In constructing this picture, man does not seek to discover new facts, that is, to make a scientific contribution. He only tries to organize the facts so that they find meaning for him. In short, man tries to give a general explanation of the world. However, the results of this activity often result in statements that are unverifiable and contrary to common sense. As Wittgenstein subtly observes: language is a labyrinth of paths. You can approach a site on one side and know where to go next, or you can get lost when you get to the same place on the other side.

The thinking person is introduced into this intellectual confusion by some subtle abuses in the use of everyday language. In one way or another, he gradually pushes the boundaries of the accepted use of words, which significantly changes their meaning. He may later doubt that his usual, confident use of these words is really correct. When this happens, the "difficulties" that have been described will begin. And to get out of this situation, it is necessary to return to the usual, correct use of key terms of its construction and show how, incorrectly using them in their activities, a person introduces himself into this conceptual confusion.

Thus, the purpose of philosophy, which emerges from the subtext of Wittgenstein’s reasoning, is mainly therapeutic in nature. It is to rid philosophy of conceptual fallacies by diagnosing their defiant causes. "Research" offers a variety of procedures to achieve the desired result. The main technique is what Wittgenstein calls the use of "language games". It assumes that we learn everyday language just as we learn to play some games.

The rules that we understand in order to use certain terms correctly are functionally similar to the rules that we master when we learn, say, to play chess. Then, to illustrate how philosophers distort ordinary expressions, Wittgenstein, in developing various language games, shows that the real rules for using these expressions are what they allow and what we are not allowed to do with these expressions. In the light of such descriptions (replacing the explanations), he is able to pinpoint those deviations from the correct use that lead to conceptual confusion – the confusion that arises when, as he put it, "language is left to its own devices."

Postpositivism in the philosophy of science. After the disappointment of scientists in the metaphysical concepts of natural philosophy, which was formed as an independent direction of philosophy of science, the tendency to hypertrophy the meaning of rational elements in scientific cognition prevailed for a long time. This led to the phenomenologized philosophy of science, the consideration of science as "things in themselves", existing and developing in isolation from the rest of the world by its own laws, which was embodied in the systems of positivism, and later – neo- positivism.

However, the "static" picture of science created by them, the inability to adequately reflect the genesis of knowledge or patterns and dynamics of science in general led to the fact that by the middle of the XX century the potential of these systems was largely exhausted … An attempt to correct the situation was initiated by representatives of a new direction in the philosophy of science – postpositivism, the founder of which was the English philosopher Carl Popper.

The concept of "postpositivism" encompasses a broad set of concepts that replaced neopositivism. Postpositivism is currently not characterized by great internal homogeneity: on many issues there is an "internal" controversy. Expressed in terms of one of its most prominent representatives – Thomas Kuhn – this philosophical trend does not have a permanent paradigm.

Conditionally, we can distinguish two main directions (naturally, they show commonality): relativistic, represented by Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, Max Podani; and fallibilistic, this group includes primarily Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos, as well as J.